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“[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”1 
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 1 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1890, the Harvard Law Review published Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis’s article, The Right to Privacy,2 changing 
forever the face of privacy law.3  Arguably, Warren and Brandeis 
attempted to import an idea of privacy more at home in Europe 
than here in the United States,4 for they sought to establish a means 
by which people could protect their own dignity;5 however, they 
only tenuously founded that means on aspects of personal liberty.6  
Thus, the approach the two path-breaking authors took may 
represent an anomaly in the law of this country.7  While various 
 
 2 Id. 
 3 Cf. ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946); Harry Kalven, Jr., 
Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
326, 327 (1966) (describing Warren and Brandeis’s article as the “most influential law 
review article of all”). 
 4 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004) (“Warren and Brandeis undertook the seminal, and still 
most cited, effort to introduce a [European]-style right of privacy into American law.”). 
 5 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214–15 (“The design of the law must be to 
protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from 
being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, 
whatsoever; their position and station, from having matters which they may properly 
prefer to keep private, made public against their will.”).  Warren and Brandeis also 
equated the right to privacy to “the more general right to the immunity of the person,—
the right to one’s personality.” Id. at 207. 
 6 Noticeably, Warren and Brandeis, while drawing many analogies to other areas of 
law such as intellectual property, did not directly implicate constitutional liberty 
concerns, such as the Fourth Amendment, or a notion of “freedom.” See id. at 207.  
While they did note early in their article that the rights to liberty and property have 
expanded as society has developed, they did so to illustrate how “the beautiful capacity 
for growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite 
protection, without interposition of the legislature.” Id. at 195. 
 7 Compare William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (suggesting 
that privacy is not an independent value at all but rather a composite of interests), with 
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forms of the tort protecting against invasion of privacy exist today 
under state common law, shortly after the time Warren and 
Brandeis made their argument for the tort, the focus of privacy law 
in this country returned to a foundation more uniquely American—
one based on liberty.8 
Why does each side of the Atlantic concentrate on a different 
aspect of personhood, liberty versus dignity, as the core inviolable 
right warranting privacy protection?  Perhaps the United States 
favors values of liberty, especially liberty against the government, 
due to its founding influences.  That may explain why the 
American right to privacy, at its core, means freedom from 
intrusions of the state, especially in one’s own home.9  Similarly, 
maybe European favor for values of dignity stems from an Old 
World ethos, concerned with the importance of not losing public 
face.  After all, Europeans consider privacy to be the right to 
protect one’s personal reputation from attack and one’s personal 
information from exposure or mishandling.10 
 
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964 (1964) (analyzing privacy tort law in light of 
Warren and Brandeis to show how Prosser was mistaken). 
 8 In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, which found a government wiretap to be 
constitutional, Brandeis quoted an earlier decision of the Supreme Court. Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  He explained, 
“‘The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty 
and security[,]’” and “‘[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense,’” rather “‘it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.’” Id. 
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).  Brandeis went further to 
note, “Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to 
the Government.  Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by 
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of 
what is whispered in the closet.” Id. at 473.  While Brandeis occupied the minority in 
Olmstead, the Court ultimately accepted his view, at least to some extent, in Katz v. 
United States. See 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 9 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (addressing the “sanctity” of the home); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000). 
 10 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1161 (describing the core European privacy rights as 
the “rights to one’s image, name, and reputation, and what the Germans call the right to 
information self-determination—the right to control the sorts of information disclosed 
about oneself” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Whether the foundation of the liberty versus dignity distinction 
came about for the reasons above, or for other reasons, matters 
little for purposes of this Article.  What really matters is the legal 
effect of the distinction.  While, on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
differences in privacy policies influence many areas of law, this 
Article focuses on but one of those areas: privacy in the workplace.  
Currently, workers in the United States face the risk that their 
employers will monitor them, not only as to their activities in the 
ordinary course of business, but also as to their personal electronic 
communications made from work.11  To be sure, the potential for 
real monetary and legal liabilities often forms a valid cause for 
concern, which motivates employers to monitor their employees, 
but that does not mean that the employees should be completely 
without protections.  Yet, the current laws do little to protect 
employees from unwanted and unnecessary surveillance by their 
employers. 
To remedy this problem, Congress should increase the level of 
protection it provides to employees by supplementing the liberty 
considerations of American privacy law with some of the dignity 
protections found in Europe.  Specifically, Congress should modify 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) by 
amending the consent provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)12 and 
adding a similar consent provision to § 2701(c).13  In each case, the 
amendment should require express written consent of the person 
subject to monitoring.  Without such consent, an entity engaged in 
 
 11 For an earlier treatment of this topic area, see Note, Addressing the New Hazards of 
the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1991). 
 12 Section 2511(2)(d) provides an exception to liability for an interception of a 
communication, stating: 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication where such person is a party to the communication or 
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception unless such communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any 
State. 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 13 Section 2702(b)(3) also provides an exception to liability for divulging the contents 
of a stored communication when consent exists. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3).  However, 
that exception only applies to an entity providing a public, not a private, service. Id. 
VOL19_BOOK3_CHIVVIS 4/21/2009  11:50:54 PM 
2009] CONSENT TO MONITORING OF EMPLOYEES 803 
the surveillance of its employees should face liability for obtaining 
personal information from an electronic communication.  In order 
to give these new consent provisions effect, Congress would also 
have to make a few other amendments to the ECPA.14 
Part I of this Article examines privacy and consent to 
monitoring of electronic communications in the workplace from an 
American prospective.  It considers the American model of privacy 
protection, which advances notions of personal liberty.  Part I also 
looks at the justifications for monitoring and the current state of 
protection in private and public workplaces.  Part II examines 
privacy and consent to monitoring from a European perspective.  It 
considers the European model of privacy protection, which 
advances notions of personal dignity.  Part II also looks at a couple 
of international mechanisms that protect privacy.  Part III of this 
Article suggests that the United States should consider the 
importance of dignity as a basis for privacy law.  Part III further 
advances some amendments that would strengthen the consent 
provisions of ECPA, making it more consistent with the workplace 
dignity protections found in Europe.  As a final matter, Part III 
stresses the importance of a default rule that protects privacy in 
employees’ personal communications.  In conclusion, this Article 
posits that amending ECPA to include an explicit consent 
provision would heighten and respect employee liberty and 
dignity.  In so doing, the amendment would respond to the century 
old call of Warren and Brandeis: to find a place for dignity in 
American privacy law. 
I. THE AMERICAN MODEL 
A. Privacy as an Aspect of Personal Liberty 
As mentioned previously, the United States bases its privacy 
rights on a strong sense of personal liberty.  One can see the 
distinction laid out in the founding documents of this country, 
 
 14 See infra Part III.B.  For instance, to make any consent provision under § 2701(c) 
meaningful, another exception, § 2701(c)(1), would have to be eliminated for employers 
providing a wire or communications service to employees. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c). 
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especially in the Bill of Rights, with its strong circumscription of 
state power.15  From the late 1700’s to the present, suspicion of the 
government has formed the underpinning of American privacy 
thinking.16  A classic statement comes from the seminal case Boyd 
v. United States,17 where the Supreme Court noted that the 
Constitution provides protection from “all invasions on the part of 
the government . . . of the sanctity of a man’s home.”18  More 
recently, the Supreme Court used similar language.  In Kyllo v. 
United States,19 the majority affirmed that the Constitution “draws 
‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’”20  Boyd and Kyllo 
illustrate how, for Americans, privacy begins with the Fourth 
Amendment; “at its origin, [it] is the right against unlawful 
searches and seizures.”21  Another recent decision, Lawrence v. 
Texas,22 takes what seems like a dignity interest, the right to 
engage in private homosexual relations, and makes it one of 
liberty.23  That decision begins with the statement, “Liberty 
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a 
dwelling or other private places.”24  Privacy then, in the United 
States, means the liberty to be free from government intrusions, 
above all, in one’s home. 
United States laws suggest Americans hold much less 
suspicion for business entities than for the government.  Most 
constitutional protections do not even directly apply to private 
businesses, except when those businesses act at the direction of the 
state.25  Some federal laws and regulations create privacy rights 
 
 15 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 16 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1211–12. 
 17 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 18 Id. at 630. 
 19 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 20 Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). 
 21 Whitman, supra note 4, at 1212.  Yet, “[o]ver time . . . the early republican 
commitment to ‘privacy’ has matured into a much more far-reaching right against state 
intrusion into our lives.” Id. 
 22 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 23 See id. at 562; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 24 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 25 In order for a private entity to face liability for violating the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Bill of Rights, a plaintiff must first establish that the entity acts in coordination 
with the government under the “state action doctrine.” See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 
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against private companies;26 however, these statutes provide spotty 
protections at best.  Some only cover a target industry or a select 
class of people,27 while others include exceptions for actions 
broader than conduct “in the ordinary course of business.”28  
Accordingly, when private employers feel they need to monitor 
their employees, current laws give the employees little recourse.  
Government employees do not fare much better, as they only enjoy 
weak protections under the Constitution. 
B. Factors Justifying Monitoring 
Valid concerns justify some level of employer monitoring of 
employee electronic communications.  For instance, an employee’s 
activities through email and the Internet while on the job could 
create a hostile work environment for other workers.  The 
employee might send sexually charged emails to a co-worker,29 
surf sexually explicit websites in plain view of others, or post false 
statements about someone.  Alternatively, the employee might 
download unauthorized copies of music or video.  In this way, 
employers that provide computer services could face liability for 
“employees’ sexual, racial, or otherwise threatening or harassing 
 
109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638–40 (1882); Virginia v. 
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); see also Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 
461 (1952) (applying the state action requirement to federal constitutional claims). See 
generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of 
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 
(1995).  The article describes the difficult analysis required “when the actions of an 
ostensibly ‘private’ entity violate constitutional norms, and the entity enjoys some kind of 
special relationship or connection to the federal or a state government.” Id. at 303. 
 26 See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 
(2006); Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006); Stored Communications Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006); Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2006); Cable 
Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 551–561 (2006). 
 27 Notably, from the examples listed, supra note 26, the Cable Communications Policy 
Act only applies to cable operators, service providers and subscribers. See 47 U.S.C. § 
552–561. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act only protects children under the 
age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C § 6501(1). 
 28 See infra Part I.C. 
 29 Two cases come to mind in this context.  In Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 
an employee’s supervisor stated in an email, “I know I’m getting to be a pain [in] the butt 
with these ride offers.  And I apologize.  But I can’t help myself.” 112 F.3d 853, 864 (7th 
Cir. 1997).  In Knox v. Indiana, a co-worker sent an email message, asking the plaintiff if 
she would like to have a “horizontal good time.” 93 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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[emails] or Internet [use] or messages, as well as for defamation, 
copyright infringement, fraud or other claims related to employee 
misconduct.”30 
The risk of losing intellectual property rights forms another 
important concern, justifying some level of surveillance.  Trade 
secret law requires companies to undertake reasonable efforts to 
maintain the secrecy of proprietary information.31  This 
information can include any “formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process” that derives its 
value “from not being generally known to . . . other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”32  A trade 
secret loses its status as a secret, and therefore its protection, when 
others learn the secret without using improper means.33  Thus, 
trade secret law seems to require some level of monitoring to 
prevent accidental or intentional breaches of secrecy. 
The risks of potential liability and of losing valuable 
intellectual property rights act as primary motivating factors 
behind employer surveillance of employees.34  While these risks do 
justify some level of monitoring, especially as to activities in the 
ordinary course of business,35 the risks hardly justify carte blanche 
 
 30 Mark E. Schreiber, Employer E-Mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and 
Investigations, 85 MASS. L. REV. 74, 74–75 (2000) (arguing that “[t]o deter inappropriate 
use and to protect themselves better, employers should implement, disseminate, and 
enforce e-mail and Internet use policies that are tailored to their specific business needs” 
and that “the policy should state the manner in which employees’ business and/or 
personal e-mail or Internet communications can or will be accessed or monitored by the 
company”). 
 31 Particularly, a trade secret must be “the subject of efforts that are reasonable under 
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (2004). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at § 1 cmt. (“[R]easonable efforts to maintain secrecy have been held to include 
advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access to a trade secret on 
[a] ‘need to know basis,’ and controlling plant access.”). 
 34 See Michael L. Rustad & Sandra L. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and 
Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829, 836–839 (2005) (“Monitoring [email] or Internet usage is 
justified, because the mishandling of these technologies is not a phantom risk.”). 
 35 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (“The efforts required to maintain secrecy are 
those ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’  The courts do not require that extreme and 
unduly expensive procedures be taken to protect trade secrets against flagrant industrial 
espionage.”). 
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authority to monitor personal electronic communications made 
from work as “workers who [are] electronically monitored 
manifest[] higher rates of depression, anxiety, and fatigue than 
others in the same business that [are] not monitored.”36 
C. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
In 1968, after the Supreme Court found telephone 
conversations subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy37 and 
proposed extensive limitations on eavesdropping,38 Congress 
enacted the Wiretap Act.39  The Act criminalized private wiretaps, 
but allowed an exception for the wiretapping of a communication 
when one party consented to the tapping.40  In 1986, Congress 
updated the Wiretap Act by passing the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, adding a provision to make the Act 
apply to the interception of electronic communications.41  ECPA 
also included two new acts, the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”) and the Pen Register Act.  As its name suggests, the SCA 
protects electronic communications in storage.42 
While the Wiretap Act and the SCA provide some protection 
for the electronic communications of individuals, they do little to 
protect employees from the surveillance of their employers 
 
 36 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 840. 
 37 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 38 See Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 58–60 (1967). 
 39 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended as Title I of ECPA at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2006)). 
 40 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(d). 
 41 Title I of ECPA, the updated Wiretap Act, defines an “intercept” as “the aural or 
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through 
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006). 
 42 Title II of ECPA, the SCA, creates civil liability for one who “(1) intentionally 
accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; 
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic 
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) 
(2006).  The statute defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, intermediate 
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission 
thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication 
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) 
(2006). 
VOL19_BOOK3_CHIVVIS 4/21/2009  11:50:54 PM 
808 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:799 
because business entities receive broad exceptions under each act.  
For instance, Congress created service provider exceptions under 
both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.  The Wiretap Act allows a 
communications service provider “to intercept, disclose, or use [a] 
communication in the normal course of [its] employment while 
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the 
rendition of [its] service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service.”43 
The SCA’s service provider exception is broader than the one 
found in the Wiretap Act, entirely exempting “the person or entity 
providing a wire or electronic communications service.”44  Another 
exception, the ordinary course of business exception, pertains 
primarily to the Wiretap Act.  It limits the definition of a 
wiretapping device of an employer to an “electronic, mechanical, 
or other device” other than one used “in the ordinary course of its 
business.”45 
Courts have interpreted the service provider exceptions broadly 
in the employment context, classifying many businesses as 
electronic communications service providers.  For instance, in 
United States v. Mullins,46 the Ninth Circuit found that American 
Airlines qualified as a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service under § 2511(2)(a) of the Wiretap Act.47  
Mullins involved three travel agents’ appeal from a conviction for 
mail and wire fraud.48  The defendants leased computer terminals 
 
 43 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) (2006). 
 44 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2006). 
 45 This section provides: 
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or 
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication other than— 
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or 
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a 
provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary 
course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the 
ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user 
for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the 
ordinary course of its business . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (2006). 
 46 United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 47 Id. at 1478. 
 48 Id. at 1474. 
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from American Airlines so that they could access American’s 
electronic travel booking service.49  American Airlines assigned 
the agents personal access codes and passwords, allowing them to 
place and edit reservations on its system.50  After receiving notice 
of an anomaly on the passenger manifest of a flight returning from 
Europe, American Airlines personnel monitored the activity 
associated with the agents’ codes and passwords.51  The company 
then notified the FBI that it suspected the agents purposefully 
manipulated the passenger manifests.52  The FBI investigated the 
incident, and the case went to trial.53  At the district court, all three 
agents received sentences that included jail time and substantial 
fines.54 
On appeal, the defendant agents argued that American’s 
monitoring violated their Fourth Amendment rights.55  In rejecting 
the agents’ argument, the Ninth Circuit cited the definitions section 
of the Wiretap Act.56  The court found that the service provider 
exception permitted American to monitor the defendants’ use of its 
electronic travel booking service.57  The court also found that 
American Airlines consented to the monitoring of its own 
system,58 which qualified its surveillance for another exception 
under the Wiretap Act.59 
In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,60 the Third 
Circuit found that the SCA provides an even broader service 
 
 49 Id.  This case took place shortly before the Internet created a dearth of demand for 
travel agency services. 
 50 Id. at 1474–75. 
 51 Id.  Due to the security atmosphere of this country following September 11, 2001, 
courts would probably now find an even broader exception for this type of airline 
computer system monitoring. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. (“The district court sentenced [one agent] to 48 months’ imprisonment and 
imposed a $250,000 fine; [the second agent] received a 24-month jail term and a $15,000 
fine; and [the third agent] got 21 months and a $5,000 fine.”). 
 55 Id. at 1478. 
 56 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511). 
 57 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). 
 58 Mullins, 992 F.2d at 1478. 
 59 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006). 
 60 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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provider exception for businesses.61  There, the court read § 
2701(c) of the SCA to “except from . . . protection all searches by 
communications service providers.”62  Fraser involved a wrongful 
termination claim brought by a former agent of Nationwide, an 
insurance company.63  The plaintiff also requested damages under 
ECPA,64 for violations of both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.65  
The facts of the case indicate that Nationwide believed the plaintiff 
was “disloyal” in his service to the company.66  In order to 
substantiate this belief, Nationwide searched all of the plaintiff’s 
email on its server, looking for email to or from the plaintiff that 
showed improper behavior.67  At trial, a representative for 
Nationwide testified that the search proved the plaintiff’s 
disloyalty, so Nationwide was justified in terminating him.68  After 
interpreting ECPA, the district court granted summary judgment to 
Nationwide.69 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision.70  As to the Wiretap Act claim, the Third Circuit 
found that the searching of email in storage did not qualify as an 
“interception” as required by the act because the searching did not 
occur contemporaneously with transmission of the email.71  As to 
the SCA claim, the Third Circuit held that Nationwide fell under 
 
 61 Id. at 115. 
 62 Id. (emphasis added).  To come to its holding, the court in Fraser compared the facts 
of the case to the facts in Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).  The 
Bohach court held that the Reno police department could, without violating the SCA, 
retrieve pager text messages stored on the police department's computer system because 
the department “is the provider of the ‘service’” and “service providers [may] do as they 
wish when it comes to accessing communications in electronic storage.” Id. at 1236; 
Fraser, 352 F.3d at 115. 
 63 Fraser, 352 F.3d at 109. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 113–15. 
 66 Id. at 109. 
 67 Id. at 110. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 114. 
 70 Id. at 115. 
 71 Id. at 114. 
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the service provider exception because it administered the email 
system that it searched.72 
While not pertaining directly to electronic communications, the 
case Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.73 provides a framework for 
interpreting the ordinary course of business exception.  There, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a personal communication may “be 
intercepted in the ordinary course of business . . . to the extent 
necessary to guard against unauthorized use of [equipment 
furnished by the business] or to determine whether the call is 
personal or not.”74 
In Watkins, the plaintiff sued her employer, alleging a violation 
of the Wiretap Act.75  The circumstance of the alleged violation 
surrounded a personal telephone call that the plaintiff made from 
work to a friend, where she talked about a job interview she 
recently had with another company.76  The plaintiff’s employer 
monitored the call and approached her about it.77  The monitoring 
upset the plaintiff, and eventually, she left her employer for the 
other company.78  As to her Wiretap Act claim, the district court 
granted summary judgment on the merits to the defendant, her 
employer.79 
On appeal, the parties did not dispute that the monitoring at 
issue violated § 2511(1)(b) of the Wiretap Act;80 so, the Eleventh 
Circuit only examined whether the defendant’s conduct came 
 
 72 Id. at 115.  As to the SCA claim, the district court had found that the email was in 
“post-transmission storage.” Id. at 114.  In affirming, the Third Circuit avoided using 
those grounds to reach its result. Id. 
 73 Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 74 Id. at 583. 
 75 Id. at 579.  As Congress did not pass ECPA until 1986, the plaintiff sued under the 
predecessor of the current Wiretap Act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968. Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.  After tempers flared over the incident, her boss fired her. Id.  However, she 
complained to another supervisor and got reinstated with apologies. Id.  Nonetheless, the 
plaintiff eventually went to work for the company where she had the interview that her 
employer overheard her talking about. Id. 
 79 Id. at 579–80. 
 80 Id. at 580. 
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within either one of two exemptions to the Act.81  First, the court 
addressed the consent exception, noting that “[c]onsent may be 
obtained for any interceptions” and that “the business or personal 
nature of the [communication] is entirely irrelevant.”82  However, 
the court did comment on the importance of the scope of the 
consent,83 and it found that the plaintiff consented to a policy of 
monitoring sales calls but not personal calls.84  As the defendant 
likely exceeded the scope of the consent by continuing to monitor 
the call after learning of its personal nature, the court found the 
defendant’s conduct probably fell outside of the consent 
exception.85 
Next, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the ordinary course of 
business exception.  As a general rule, it noted that “if the 
intercepted [communication is] a business call, then . . . monitoring 
of it was in the ordinary course of business.  If it was a personal 
[communication], the monitoring was probably, but not certainly, 
not in the ordinary course of business.”86  The court then 
explained, “[A] personal call may be intercepted in the ordinary 
 
 81 Id.  The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s claims under a duplicative provision of the Communications Act. Id. 
 82 Id. at 581 (noting that as long as the requisite business connection is demonstrated, 
the business extension exemption represents the “circumstances under which non-
consensual interception” does not violate section 2511(1)(b) (citing Briggs v. Am. Air 
Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 419 (5th Cir.1980))). 
 83 Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582.  The Eleventh Circuit noted: 
We can think of no reason why consent under [the Wiretap Act] 
cannot be limited.  We therefore hold that consent within the meaning 
of section 2511(2)(d) is not necessarily an all or nothing proposition; 
it can be limited.  It is the task of the trier of fact to determine the 
scope of the consent and to decide whether and to what extent the 
interception exceeded that consent. 
Id. 
 84 Id. at 581. 
 85 Id. at 582.  However, the Eleventh Circuit did direct the district court to settle the 
factual issues surrounding the consent on remand. Id. at 585 (“Among the factual 
questions that should be considered are: What was the monitoring policy to which 
Watkins consented?”). 
 86 Id. at 582 (“The phrase ‘in the ordinary course of business’ cannot be expanded to 
mean anything that interests a company.  Such a broad reading ‘flouts the words of the 
statute and establishes an exemption that is without basis in the legislative history’ of [the 
Wiretap Act].” (quoting Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979))). 
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course of business to determine its nature, but never its contents.”87  
Yet, instead of holding for the plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit 
remanded to the district court, charging it to determine whether the 
plaintiff’s employer learned of the plaintiff’s job interview during 
a permissible window of interception.88  While the court suggested 
the permissible window for determining the nature of a call was 
less than three minutes, it left that determination to the trial court.89 
Of the three cases described above, only Watkins draws a line 
between the interception of communications to protect legitimate 
business interests and the interception of purely personal 
communications, making the latter a likely violation of the Wiretap 
Act. 
In Mullins, the Ninth Circuit may have rightly found that the 
monitoring conducted by American Airlines did not violate 
ECPA;90 however, the court did so without determining the scope 
of permissible monitoring.  Perhaps American Airlines should 
receive an exemption under ECPA for monitoring fraudulent 
activities on its system because fraud represents an affront to 
American’s legitimate business concerns, but that exemption 
should not broadly stem from it providing a wire or electronic 
communication service.  Additionally, to the extent the analysis in 
Mullins suggests that the party conducting the monitoring of an 
employee or agent can consent to the monitoring itself,91 the 
decision presents an unworkable interpretation of ECPA, 
effectively eviscerating the statute’s protections. 
The decision reached by the Third Circuit in Fraser suffers 
from greater problems.  The court’s interpretation of the Wiretap 
Act places all employee email communications under the sole 
protection of the SCA.92  This solution is problematic because an 
employer can avoid reading an email “contemporaneous with 
 
 87 Id. at 583. 
 88 Id. at 584. 
 89 Id. at 584.  “It has been widely advertised that one may reach out by telephone and 
touch all sorts of people in 3 minutes or less; it seems to us that it should not take that 
long to determine whether a call is of a personal or a business nature.” Id. at 585 n.10. 
 90 See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text. 
 91 United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 92 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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transmission,” and instead, it can resort to a stored copy of the 
email.93  The Fraser court’s interpretation of ECPA would not 
necessarily harm the privacy interests of employees if it were not 
for the blanket immunity the courts give business entities for 
searches of stored communications they conduct on email systems 
they provide.  Absent from the court’s analysis was whether ECPA 
restricts the scope of the search to communications in which the 
employer has a legitimate business concern. 
Even the analysis in Watkins presents some troubling 
implications.  There, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the scope 
of consent should have limitations and that consent “is not to be 
cavalierly implied;”94 however, the court did, in fact, imply 
consent.  The court found that a stated policy of monitoring sales 
calls, along with the plaintiff’s knowledge of the policy when she 
accepted employment, created consent to the monitoring of sales 
calls.95  Thus, the analysis of Watkins allows a loophole through 
which businesses can escape all liability under ECPA.  An 
employer need only have a stated policy, to which an employee 
need not even explicitly convey consent, that it may monitor all 
business and personal calls. 
D. The Lack of Safeguards under the Fourth Amendment 
As mentioned earlier, employees working for private 
employers receive little help from the Constitution because it 
“erects no shield against merely private conduct, however 
discriminatory or wrongful.”96  Particularly, the Fourth 
Amendment “does not protect against a search or seizure by a 
private party on its own initiative, even if the search or seizure is 
an arbitrary action.”97  However, despite their constitutional 
protections, government employees fare little better than private 
employees when subjected to monitoring by their employers. 
 
 93 See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
 94 Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
 97 Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 264, 271 (W.D. Mich. 1990). 
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O’Connor v. Ortega98 illustrates how little constitutional 
protection government employees receive when their employers 
monitor or search their personal communications.  There, the 
Supreme Court found that “a probable cause requirement for 
searches . . . would impose intolerable burdens on public 
employers.”99 
In Ortega, the plaintiff, a physician and psychiatrist, filed suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his employers had violated 
the rights provided to him under the Fourth Amendment.100  The 
potential Fourth Amendment violation stemmed from a search that 
the plaintiff’s employer conducted.101  The plaintiff’s supervisor, 
the executive director of the public hospital where he worked, 
suspected that the plaintiff had engaged in improprieties while 
running the hospital’s residency program.102  In order to 
substantiate his suspicions, the executive director placed the 
plaintiff on administrative leave and appointed a team to conduct 
an investigation of the plaintiff’s activities.103  The leader of the 
investigative team decided to conduct a thorough search of the 
plaintiff’s office while he was away.104  The team entered the 
office a number of times and seized some of the plaintiff’s 
personal items from his desk and file cabinet.105  After the team 
concluded its investigation, the hospital terminated the plaintiff’s 
employment.106 
In considering whether the above search violated the plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights, first the Court determined whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office.107  
The undisputed evidence disclosed that the plaintiff did not share 
 
 98 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 99 Id. at 724. 
 100 Id. at 714. 
 101 Id. at 713. 
 102 Id. at 712–13. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 713. 
 105 Id.  These items included a Valentine’s Day card, a photograph, and book of poetry. 
Id.  A former resident physician had sent these items to the plaintiff, and, at a hearing 
before the state personnel board, the plaintiff’s employer used them to impeach her 
credibility when she testified on the plaintiff’s behalf. Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 715–16. 
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his desk or file cabinets with any other employees and that he kept 
only personal communications and communications with patients 
unconnected with the hospital in his office, along with his personal 
financial records and some personal gifts and mementos.108  
Notably, the plaintiff did not keep any files on physicians in 
residency training in his office.109  Thus, the Court found the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and 
file cabinet.110 
Next, the Court turned to what procedural hurdles it should 
place before a public employer that, once passed, would make its 
search of an employee’s protected space lawful.  Citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.,111 the Court noted, “[only] in those exceptional 
circumstances in which special needs . . . make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable” should the court 
abrogate that standard.112  However, the Court seemingly skipped 
the special needs analysis,113 summing up its position in a 
statement that “[i]t is simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in 
most government agencies to learn the subtleties of the probable 
cause standard.”114  Thus, the Court held that “public employer 
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of 
government employees for non-investigatory, work-related 
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, 
 
 108 Id. at 718. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 719.  However, the Court noted: 
Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and 
file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private 
sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practice and 
procedures, or by legitimate regulation . . . . The employee’s 
expectation of privacy must be assessed in context of the employment 
relation . . . . [S]ome government offices may be so open to fellow 
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. 
Id. at 717–18. 
 111 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 112 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 720 (alteration in original). 
 113 Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, noted, “[a]lthough the plurality mentions 
the ‘special need’ step, . . . it turns immediately to a balancing test to formulate its 
standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  He further stated, 
“This error is significant because, given the facts of this case, no ‘special need’ exists 
here to justify dispensing with the warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Id. 
 114 Id. at 724–25 (majority opinion). 
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should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all 
circumstances.”115  The Court articulated the standard of 
reasonableness as conduct “according to the dictates of reason and 
common sense.”116 
The level of Fourth Amendment protection in the workplace 
set by the Court in Ortega shows noticeable weaknesses.  First, an 
employee must prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
area searched, instead of in the communication apprehended, 
which is no easy task.  Not all employees enjoy the comfort of 
private offices as the plaintiff in Ortega did.  Second, an employee 
must prove any monitoring was unreasonable, a circumstance 
much harder to show than a lack of probable cause.  As their 
constitutional remedy only weakly protects them in the workplace, 
public employees, like private employees, could use a more 
effective statutory remedy.  In contemplating one, Congress should 
consider the statutory privacy protections that European countries 
provide their citizens. 
II. THE EUROPEAN MODEL 
A. Privacy as an Aspect of Personal Dignity 
Unlike the core foundation of American privacy law, largely 
concerned with personal liberty, European privacy law focuses 
more on protecting aspects of personal dignity.117  Why does 
Europe strive to protect and guarantee certain levels of respect, 
social esteem, and personal honor for its citizens?  From the point 
of view of many Europeans and Americans, laws protecting one’s 
dignity came as a reaction against the indignities perpetrated in the 
name of fascism, especially Nazism.118 
On the one hand, that explanation may oversimplify the 
evolution of privacy law in Europe, for, as Warren and Brandeis 
 
 115 Id. at 725–26. 
 116 Id. at 725 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985)). 
 117 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1164 (“The political and social values of ‘dignity’ 
and ‘honor’ are indeed what is at stake in the [European] concept of privacy.”). 
 118 See id. at 1165. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA 
AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003). 
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recognized,119 the history of European laws protecting dignity 
began long before the postwar period.120  On the other hand, the 
postwar period did play an important role in creating modern 
European dignity rights, much as the Revolutionary War played its 
role in fostering American liberty rights.  Before the Second World 
War, only high-status persons could expect to have the courts 
protect their personal honor,121 while members of lower classes 
lived their lives without a meaningful right to respect.122  
Throughout the past seventy years, average Europeans have 
“leveled-up” to experience, many, if not all, of the rights once held 
only by the former ruling class.123  Now all citizens of Europe’s 
core states may experience protections for their personal reputation 
and personal information.124 
To be sure, the American system of liberty protection is not 
without its advantages over the European system of dignity 
protection.  Unlike the United States, where privacy means 
protection from state intrusion, governments in Europe accomplish 
a remarkable level of surveillance with little or no uproar from 
their citizenry.125  Further, in Europe, governments enforce some 
dignity norms that Americans would find absurd, perhaps even an 
affront to their liberty.126  The European laws regulating childrens’ 
 
 119 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214, 214 n.1 (adapting notions of French 
privacy law to limit the breadth of a tort against invasion of privacy: “The right to 
privacy, limited as such a right must necessarily be, has already found expression in the 
law of France”). 
 120 Whitman, supra note 4, at 1165–66. 
 121 Id. at 1170–71. A disproportion of concern for royalty in European privacy thinking 
still exists.  For instance, “German texts list royalty first among the classes of ‘public 
figures’ who require special treatment in the law of privacy, while French texts . . . only 
list royalty second, after politicians.” Id. at 1169–70. 
 122 James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 
1270, 1320–30 (2000). 
 123 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1164–71 (“This long term secular leveling-up 
tendency has shaped [European] law in a very fundamental way.”). 
 124 See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 125 “In Germany, everybody must be formally registered with the police at all times.” 
Whitman, supra note 4, at 1158.  Further, in France and Germany, “telephones are tapped 
at ten to thirty times the rate they are tapped in the United States—and in the Netherlands 
and Italy, at 130 to 150 times the rate.” Id. at 1159.  However, as others have noted, “The 
[United States] is far more predisposed to subordinate privacy to security than the 
Europeans are.” Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 865. 
 126 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 1158. 
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birth-names stand as but one example.127  Thus, in some ways, 
European regulation of dignity rights may go too far.  However, 
one can hardly argue that, by obliging their bosses to respect the 
privacy of their personal electronic communications in the 
workplace,128 Europeans do not confirm in themselves at least a 
somewhat heightened sense of personhood. 
B. Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Directive 95/46/EC 
Shortly after beginning to recover from the devastating and 
costly Second World War, the countries of Europe gathered to 
draft legislation, which would protect the region from further 
human rights atrocities.129  The Council of Europe Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
1950 (“ECHR”) resulted from their combined efforts, and it now 
forms a legal standard that each member state of the European 
Union has incorporated into its national laws.130  The European 
Court of Human Rights enforces the protocols of the ECHR;131 
individuals appeal to the court as an applicant when they have 
exhausted their domestic remedies, receiving a judgment binding 
on both the individual and the respondent state.132 
Europeans enjoy some significant privacy protections under the 
ECHR.  Article 8 of the ECHR specifically defends the right one 
has “to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his 
correspondence.”133  The European Court of Human Rights 
extended the definition of “private life” to include the right to 
protection for one’s personal matters in certain business 
environments, and it expanded the definition of “correspondence” 
to include email and other electronic communications.134 
 
 127 Id. 
 128 See infra Part II.B.  European law also protects “the right of workers to respectful 
treatment by their bosses and coworkers.” Whitman, supra note 4, at 1165. 
 129 See Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 871. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 872. 
 133 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 134 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 872. 
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For instance, in Niemietz v. Germany,135 the European Court of 
Human Rights thought it too restrictive to limit the notion of 
“private life” to an “inner circle” where an individual may live as 
he chooses, excluding from the definition everything outside that 
circle.136  Instead, the court found that “private life” may include 
“activities of a professional or business nature”137 because, at 
times, one may not be able to distinguish clearly whether “an 
individual’s activities form part of his personal or business life.”138 
Niemietz involved a search of the law office premises of the 
applicant, Mr. Niemietz, to find information relevant to a crime of 
insult, an illegal act in Germany.139  The authorities used a warrant 
to conduct the search, trying to discover the author of an offensive 
letter, which constituted the insult.140  The court found that the 
“search impinged on [applicant’s] secrecy to an extent . . . 
disproportionate [under] the circumstances,”141 thus, it concluded 
that the search resulted in a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.142  
However, finding an absence of damages, the court dismissed 
applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.143 
 In another case, Halford v. United Kingdom,144 the European 
Court of Human Rights applied Article 8 of the ECHR to the 
interception of personal phone calls at work.  It found “telephone 
calls made from business premises as well as from the home may 
 
 135 Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (1992). 
 136 Id. ¶ 29 (“Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to 
establish . . . relationships with human beings.”). 
 137 See id. (“[I]t is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of 
people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with 
[people].”). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. ¶¶ 6–16. 
 140 Id. ¶ 10. 
 141 Id. ¶ 37 (expressing concern that “the attendant publicity must have been capable of 
affecting adversely the applicant’s professional reputation, in the eyes of both his existing 
clients and of the public at large”). 
 142 Id. ¶ 38. 
 143 Id. ¶ 43 (“[A]lthough Mr. Niemietz stated at the hearing that his request extended to 
his costs and expenses referable to the proceedings . . . he has supplied no particulars of 
that expenditure.”). 
 144 Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (1997). 
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be covered by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ 
within the meaning of Article 8.”145 
In Halford, the applicant, an assistant chief constable, 
complained that her employer, the Merseyside Police Authority, 
intercepted calls made from her office telephone.146  Prior to the 
monitoring, she had sued the police department for sexual 
harassment, as the authority had denied her several promotions.147  
Before the European Court of Human Rights, the United Kingdom 
government, representing the view of the police authority, 
submitted that telephone calls one makes from the workplace fall 
outside the protection of Article 8.148  The court disagreed and held 
that the telephone calls applicant made sat “within the scope of 
‘private life’ and ‘correspondence.’”149  In its decision, the court 
noted that the police authority had not explicitly told applicant her 
calls would be liable to interception and that this gave applicant a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in those calls.150  The decision 
in Halford posits an interesting solution to the problem of 
employee monitoring.  It suggests that such monitoring will not 
violate Article 8 if the employer achieves express notice and 
consent from its employee.151 
Europeans receive another layer of protection from monitoring 
through European Council Directive 95/46 (“Directive 95/46/EC” 
or “the Directive”),152 the directive on the protection of personal 
data.  “Directive 95/46/EC establishes a ‘minimum framework’ of 
data protection requirements,”153 which each member state of the 
European Community implemented into law.  “These requirements 
 
 145 Id. ¶ 44. 
 146 See id. ¶17. 
 147 See id. ¶¶ 10–11. 
 148 See id. ¶ 43 (“At the hearing before the Court, counsel for the Government 
expressed the view that an employer should in principle, without prior knowledge of the 
employee, be able to monitor calls made by the latter on telephones provided by the 
employer.”). 
 149 Id. ¶ 46. 
 150 Id. ¶ 45. 
 151 Id. ¶ 44. 
 152 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 153 Lothar Determann et al., Global Data Transfers and the European Directive A 
Practical Analysis of the New ICC Contract Clauses, 4 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 153, 
154 (2005). 
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apply to any collection, use, disclosure, or other processing of 
information about an identified or identifiable natural person in the 
[European Economic Area].”154  “[T]he definition of ‘processing 
of personal data’ set out in Article 2 of Directive 95/46/EC also 
covers all forms of computer surveillance,” including the 
monitoring of personally identifiable electronic 
communications.155  Thus, the Directive has omnibus scope, and it 
“applies broadly to all industries and business sectors,” both 
private and public.156  It certainly applies to monitoring in the 
workplace.157 
Article 7 of the Directive states, “Member States shall provide 
that personal data may be processed only if” the processing meets 
one of six exceptions.158  Exception (a), the most important 
exception for the sake of this Article, allows data processing when 
“the data subject has unambiguously given his consent.”159  Article 
2 of the act further defines consent as “any freely given and 
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject 
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being 
processed.”160  Thus, these provisions require consent that is 
“freely given, specific and informed.”161  Under this conception of 
consent, any employer that wishes to monitor its employee must 
notify the employee of the nature and purpose of the monitoring, 
which must be specific and not over-general, and then it must 
achieve express consent.162 
Taken together, the ECHR and Directive 95/46/EC give 
significant protections to both private and public employees in 
Europe.  By experiencing privacy as to their personal 
 
 154 Id. 
 155 Roberto F. Filho & Mark Jeffery, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: 
Notice and Consent, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 551, 554 (2002). 
 156 See Determann et al., supra note 153, at 154. 
 157 See Filho & Jeffery, supra note 155, at 562–67. 
 158 Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC). 
 161 See Filho & Jeffery, supra note 155, at 564. 
 162 See id. at 564–65 (“[T]here remains a considerable margin of doubt . . . over the 
closely-related question of whether consent must be given every time the employer 
conducts a particular form of surveillance or processing; or whether a general, once-and-
for-all consent to a certain form of processing would be valid.”). 
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communications and data at work, Europeans may, indeed, feel 
more dignified in the workplace.  But, are their liberty interests 
more protected?—Arguably not.  Enforcement of Article 8 of the 
ECHR against government authorities acting pursuant to protocol 
suffers from noticeable weaknesses,163 and Directive 95/46/EC 
entirely exempts processing “necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation.”164  Further, in some ways, both schemes for protecting 
privacy may go too far.  Neither the ECHR nor the Directive has a 
clearly articulated exemption for employee monitoring an 
employer undertakes in the ordinary course of business, and as 
discussed above, some instances do exist that justify employee 
monitoring.  Therefore, this Article does not advance that the 
United States should engage in the full-scale adoption of European 
protections for electronic communications.  The United States 
may, however, take something of value from the work-place 
privacy protections implemented by its neighbors across the 
Atlantic. 
III. REDEFINING CONSENT: RECOGNIZING LIBERTY AND DIGNITY 
A. The Importance of Dignity 
Professor Bloustein, a noted privacy scholar, once wrote, 
“[A]nalysis of the interest involved in . . . privacy cases is of 
utmost significance because in our own day scientific and 
technological advances have raised the spectre of new and 
frightening invasions of privacy.”165  His statement confronted a 
pressing reality that is ever more true today, especially in the 
workplace.  In 2004, a survey of employer monitoring confirmed 
that 74% of responding companies monitor the outgoing and 
incoming email of their employees and that 60% monitor 
 
 163 For instance, in Niemietz, even after finding the warrant at issue faulty, the court did 
not award the applicant any just compensation. See Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 23 (1992); supra notes 135–43 and accompanying text.  Perhaps that is why 
Niemietz and Halford number among the select few cases addressing Article 8 of the 
ECHR in the last twenty years. 
 164 Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC). 
 165 Bloustein, supra note 7, at 963. 
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employee Internet connections.166  Further, as Justice Blackmun 
noted in his dissent in Ortega, “It is, unfortunately, all too true that 
the workplace has become another home for most working 
Americans. . . .  Consequently, an employee’s private life must 
intersect with the workplace.”167 
When confronted with these actualities, perhaps then, all 
Americans should respond as Professor Bloustein did.  In his 1964 
article, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, he explained that 
just as we may regard these intrusions “as offensive to our concept 
of individualism and the liberty it entails, so too should we regard 
privacy as a dignitary [injury].”168  In other words, the United 
States needs to consider laws that protect privacy not only as an 
aspect of liberty, but also as an aspect of dignity.  By implementing 
the changes to ECPA that this Article suggests below, Congress 
may be able to accomplish that goal for employees in the 
workplace. 
Before considering a change to ECPA, which would increase 
its dignity protections, however, this Article must address one last 
aspect of liberty that comes into play with business entities: 
freedom of contract.  In the past, the Supreme Court struck down 
laws limiting freedom of contract in the employer/employee 
context, characterizing the dispute as a conflict between “the 
power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to 
liberty.”169  While some of the cases espousing freedom of contract 
 
 166 See Reginald C. Govan & Freddie Mac, Workplace Privacy, in 33RD ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 245, 251 (Practising Law Institute 2004) (noting the 
study also “found a positive correlation between the size of the company and its level of 
monitoring and surveillance, with the largest companies conducting the most 
surveillance”). 
 167 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 168 See Bloustein, supra note 7, at 1002 (speaking of the torts protecting privacy).  
Bloustein also noted, “The right to privacy in the form we know it, however, had to await 
the advent of the urbanization of our way of life . . . because only then was a significant 
and everyday threat to personal dignity . . . realized.” Id. at 984. 
 169 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1906).  In Lochner, the Supreme 
Court considered a statute that restricted the power of employers to require their 
employees, in this case bakers, to work over sixty hours a week. Id. at 52–53.  The Court 
saw the statute as unconstitutional, noting: 
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between 
the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in 
which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer.  The 
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as a fundamental right fell into disfavor during the New Deal, 
freedom of contract remains an aspect central to the American idea 
of liberty.  As European courts hold little respect for contracts 
signed in the employment context,170 any consideration of 
European dignity protections will have to ignore that aspect of 
European law; it is too incompatible with American ideals. 
B. Looking to Europe for Help in Amending ECPA 
In suggesting a change to American law to increase dignity 
protections, this Article looks across the Atlantic to those countries 
more familiar with privacy as an aspect of dignity, just as Warren 
and Brandeis did in their privacy article.  Yet this Article does not 
propose to completely do away with the statutory scheme already 
in place.  Instead, it posits that, with only small changes, ECPA 
can provide for worker dignity and allow for justified employer 
monitoring.  Employees need a more robust ECPA because, for 
private employees, it forms one of the only protections they have.  
Public employees would benefit too, since they receive little 
protection from the Fourth Amendment. 
As the first amendment to ECPA, Congress should eliminate 
employer eligibility for the service provider exceptions in both the 
Wiretap Act under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)171 and the SCA under 
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1),172 when the case concerns monitoring of 
an employee.  As illustrated above, courts have interpreted these 
exceptions in such a way as to make other exceptions, such as 
consent, redundant and meaningless.173  The SCA’s service 
provider exception stands as the prime example.174  Most 
 
general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of 
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution (citation omitted). Under that provision no 
State can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law. 
Id. at 53. 
 170 See Determann et al., supra note 153, at 156. 
 171 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 173 See supra Part I.C. 
 174 Remember, this exemption was read by the Third Circuit to “except from [the 
SCA’s] protection all searches by communications service providers.” Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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employers provide email and Internet service to their employees, 
and classifying these employers as service providers when they do 
so exempts them from the SCA, leaving them free to monitor their 
employees without regard to whether the monitoring addresses a 
legitimate business concern. 
As a second amendment to ECPA, Congress should implement 
the ordinary course of business exception as defined by the court in 
Watkins for both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.175  For the Wiretap 
Act, this would mean adding additional provisions to the current 
exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a).176  For the SCA, this 
would mean creating an entirely new exemption under 18 U.S.C. § 
2701(c).177  The ordinary course of business exception should 
entitle an employer only to monitor the communications of an 
employee if the communication pertains to a legitimate business 
concern.  As explained by Watkins, this exception must have 
limited scope;178 there must be minimization of the harm to the 
employee’s dignity. 
The minimization requirement of the statute should provide for 
the following contingencies.  If an employer seeks to monitor a 
communication to find out whether it is business related or 
personal, the employer must immediately cease monitoring when it 
discovers the communication is indeed personal.  In the context of 
personal telephone communications, an employer should not listen 
for more than three minutes before ceasing to monitor the call.179  
In the context of email communications, an employer should not 
review more than the subject line of the email.  In the context of 
Internet usage, an employer should, as in the phone context, not 
examine more than three minutes of usage, whether the usage is 
intercepted or stored.  All of these limits should apply during a 
 
 175 See supra notes 73–85 and accompanying text. 
 176 Currently, the exception listed here does not require minimization, as Watkins does. 
See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d. 577, 583–84 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 177 The ordinary course of business exception for employers could replace the service 
provider exception currently found in 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1). 
 178 See Watkins, 704 F.2d. at 583–84. 
 179 Three minutes is the length of time used by the court in Watkins. See id. at 585. 
Upon further analysis of the time it takes to determine if a call is business or personal, 
this three minute limit could be revised. 
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calendar day.  That is, employers should only be able to take one 
“peak” per day. 
This minimization requirement raises another concern, which 
may warrant an additional “poisonous fruits” provision.  
Employers may attempt to benefit from personal information they 
overhear even when they abide by the guidelines set out above.  
Thus, Congress should limit the use of any personal information 
“accidentally” attained while an employer “peaks” to see if the 
communication is for business or personal reasons.  Congress 
should also limit the use of any personal information attained while 
monitoring a communication in the ordinary course of business,180 
unless the personal information is inseparably intertwined with a 
legitimate business purpose.  Moreover, misuse of personal 
information should constitute a violation of ECPA. 
As the final, and most important, amendment, Congress should 
alter the consent provisions of the Wiretap Act and the SCA.  As 
discussed above, freedom to contract forms a central aspect of 
American liberty, and as such, Congress should not eliminate the 
provision altogether.  However, current interpretations of consent 
to monitoring of personal communications in the workplace create 
an unworkable and undignified solution.  How can an employee 
freely contract when a court implies the employee’s consent, or 
rather, finds the consent of another adequate?181  In order to 
preserve the bargaining power of an employee, and therefore the 
employee’s dignity and liberty, Congress should adopt some of the 
consent provisions of Directive 95/46/EC. 
In amending the consent provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) 
and adding a similar consent provision to § 2701(c), Congress 
should require that any consent to monitoring of personal 
communications be freely given, specific, and informed.182  It 
 
 180 Some business communications, undoubtedly, contain personal information, as 
many people engage in business relationships with their personal friends or become 
personal friends with those they engage in business with. 
 181 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 182 See supra note 161 and accompanying text; Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC). 
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should also be explicit and unambiguous.183  In practice, this 
means that an employee should have full notice of the scope of and 
the justifications for the monitoring of personal communications.  
Full notice would be beneficial because the alternative, 
“widespread individual ignorance[,] hinders development through 
the privacy marketplace of appropriate norms about personal data 
use.”184  The employer should give the employee a form detailing 
the extent of the monitoring for the employee to sign.  The form 
should have no other provisions than those dealing with the 
monitoring of personal, non-business, communications.  The 
employer should ask the employee—orally, not in writing—if the 
employee understands the provisions, and the employer should 
offer further explanation, if necessary.  Last, the employee should 
have to sign the form next to a statement of explicit consent for the 
monitoring of the employee’s personal communications. 
All of the above-mentioned steps may sound tedious, and they 
are.  However, one must remember that the amendments this 
Article suggests would also reaffirm an ordinary course of business 
exception to monitoring.  The above stated consent exception 
would apply only to personal communications, allowing an 
employee to ask why the employer feels it necessary to monitor 
personal communications.  Its specificity requirement would limit 
the scope of monitoring to the extent the employer can justify.  
Moreover, the consent exception would provide a bargaining point 
in employment negotiations.  If an employer feels it must monitor 
extensively to protect itself, perhaps it will have to pay its 
employees a little more.185 
This Article needs to address one last aspect of the consent 
exception for ECPA: the default rule.186  That is, in the absence of 
explicit consent, what will the rule be?  A simple answer to that 
 
 183 See supra note 159 and accompanying text; Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC). 
 184 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1683 (1999). 
 185 Id. at 1681–91; cf. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246–47 (1998). 
 186 Jerry Kang has addressed the importance of default rules. See Kang, supra note 185, 
at 1247–59 (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the information collector should process 
personal data only in functionally necessary ways.”). 
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question exists: in the absence of consent, either employer 
interception of personal communications or employer access of 
stored personal communications will violate ECPA.  Besides the 
ordinary course of business exception, no other exception would 
apply.187  In this way, the default rule presents employees with a 
choice, and freedom to choose would enhance both the liberty and 
the dignity of the employee.188 
Some might argue that “high transaction costs may convert this 
‘default’ rule into a practically ‘immutable’ rule.”189  For instance, 
on the one hand, a small employer may not have the infrastructure 
to secure informed consent.  In that case, all employees would 
enjoy the full protections under ECPA for their personal 
communications.  Large companies, on the other hand, will likely 
have the infrastructure to secure consent.  However, cost cutting 
across the business as a whole will encourage such a company to 
restrict its monitoring to the extent it is necessary,190 especially if 
employees argue for higher pay to counter the intrusion into their 
personal lives. 
C. Responding to Warren and Brandeis’ Call 
In the conclusion of their article, The Right to Privacy, Warren 
and Brandeis commented, “[L]aw has always recognized a man’s 
house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers 
engaged in the execution of its commands.”191  Then the two 
authors rebuked, “Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to 
constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or 
prurient curiosity?”192 
In the terms of this Article, Warren and Brandeis seem to have 
suggested: Why should the law only protect one’s privacy as an 
 
 187 That is, no other exception would apply for employer use of the information.  
Government use may still be excepted under other provisions. 
 188 See Kang, supra note 185, at 1259–65 (“[S]urveillance is in tension with human 
dignity.”). 
 189 Id. at 1250. 
 190 Id. at 1250–51 (“[E]ven if transaction costs are not large enough to transform default 
rules into immutable ones, the default rule still matters because ‘it determines who will 
bargain and at what cost.’”). 
 191 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 220. 
 192 Id. 
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aspect of liberty—freedom from the intrusion of the state in one’s 
own home, when it could also protect privacy as an aspect of 
dignity—freedom from the intrusion of everyone, including the 
state, in one’s personal affairs?  While each side of the Atlantic 
may view liberty or dignity as the core inviolable right subject to 
privacy protection, perhaps here in the United States we can 
enhance our dignity protections without sacrificing our liberty or 
the concerns of our businesses.  By amending ECPA, Congress 
may be able to accomplish just such an ideal for American 
employees, protecting privacy as an aspect of liberty and dignity. 
 
